RESULTS OF THE REFERENDA OF 24TH APRIL 2004

 

 

The results of the referenda of the 24th April 2004 were the following:

The Greek Cypriot community voted against the Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan by 75,83% and by 24,17% in favor.

The Turkish Cypriot community voted in favor of the Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan by 64,91% and by 35,09% against it.

 

 

PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS  IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEGATIVE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM

 

Christofis Economides

(Economist-Historian)

 

 

A.   President Tassos Papadopoulos is the main  responsible

 

 

Mr. Papadopoulos, as a lawyer, should have known that, according to Article 25 of the UN CHARTER, “all members of the United Nations have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”. Therefore, Mr. Papadopoulos, as a representative of Cyprus, should have advised the Greek Cypriot voters in the referendum of the 24th April 2004 to reply YES.

 

Instead of that, he advised them to reply with a “RESOUNDING NO” thus rejecting the Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan, although he should have known that this reply would mean that the Turkish occupying troops would continue to occupy the 37% of the Republic of Cyprus.

 

More particularly, the obligation of the people of Cyprus to accept and carry out the Plan proposed by the Secretary-General is based on the following:

 

(a)                             The Security Council by its Resolution 1475 of 14th April 2003 has approved the third Plan of the Secretary-General, providing the following:

 

“The Security Council,

 

1)      Commends the extraordinary effort made by the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser and his team since 1999 in pursuance of his Good Offices mission and within the framework of Security Council resolution 1250 (1999);

2)      Further commends the Secretary-General for taking the initiative to present to the parties a comprehensive settlement plan aimed at bridging the gaps between them, drawing upon the talks that began in December 1999 under United Nations auspices and, following negotiations, to revise that plan on 10 December 2002 and 26 February 2003…

3)      Gives its full support to the Secretary-General’s carefully balanced plan of 26 February 2003 as a unique basis for further negotiations, and calls on all concerned to negotiate within the framework of the Secretary-General’s Good Offices, using the plan to reach a comprehensive settlement”, which was actually done in Bourgenstock, with the following results:

 

(b)                             In Bourgenstock, Mr. Papadopoulos accepted to continue under the auspices of the Secretary-General, in accordance with the S.G.’ s proposal in New York on the 10th February 2004, which provided that if the two negotiators could not reach an agreed solution, they would be obliged to accept the S. G. ‘s mandatory arbitration.

 

(c)                             Mr. Papadopoulos accepted the conditions posed by the S.G., because as he mentioned in his Declaration of 7th April 2004 “If I did not respond positively to the invitation of the Secretary General I would have been acting contrary to the firm position of the National Council and to our firm position that we are seeking a solution through negotiations under the auspices of the UN. With the agreement of the numerically larger political parties that had accompanied me to New York and that of the then Government and now opposition in Greece we accepted this change in procedure. (p.3)

 

(d)                             In his declaration, Mr. Papadopoulos mentioned that in the S.G. ‘s final decision, as an arbitrator, which was included in his Fifth Plan, “there are improvements compared to the 3rd and 4th Annan plan” (p.4).

 

 

The conclusion is that it was Mr. Papadopoulos’s obligation to advise the Greek Cypriot voters to approve the UN Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan for a final solution to Cyprus problem.

 

Instead of this, Mr. Papadopoulos deliberately misdirected the three-quarters of the Greek Cypriot voters to vote a “resounding NO” to the plan.  Thus, the Cyprus Problem continues to remain unsolved.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B.      Mr. Papadopoulos in his declaration of 7th of April 2004 to the Greekcypriot voters  avoided to tell them the following consequences of the rejection of the Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan

 

 

 

(a)    The main consequence will be the fact that the Turkish troops will continue to occupy the area of Cyprus, which they conquered in 1974, and the very strong Turkish air force will continue to be able to bombard any place in Cyprus since the cease-fire agreement signed in 1974 and not a final peace agreement between Turkey and Cyprus, which President Papadopoulos told them not to sign.

 

(b)   Also in his speech, Mr. Papadopoulos claimed that before taking his decision to ask the Greekcypriot voters to reject in an absolute way the S.G.’ s Fifth Plan, he had asked and received “the opinions of foreign international relations and constitutional experts on specific aspects and provisions of the plan” (p.2). With this argument he let the voters believe that “foreign international relations and constitutional experts agreed with the rejection of the S.G. ‘s Plan”, whereas in reality all foreign international relations and constitutional experts who expressed their surprise for the negative result of the Referendum by the Greekcypriot side.

 

(c)    Mr. Papadopoulos discouraged the Greek Cypriot voters from reading the plan,stating that the contents were too complicated and difficult to comprehend. This contributed to the fact that the voters believed what Mr. Papadopoulos told them. However, as we can be seen below, the contents and clauses of the plan were quite simple and easy to comprehend.

 

(d)   In his Declaration, President Papadopoulos stated that “as President of the Republic and elected representative of the Greek Cypriot community, I have taken up the heavy responsibility of carrying out the negotiations.”(p.10)  hinting that his views mentioned in his Declaration would be “neutral”. Instead of this, however, and while he had to present the pros and cons of the plan, Mr. Papadopoulos called on the public to reject the Secretary General’s fifth plan with a “resounding NO”. He had stated that he would take a responsible unbiased stand in explaining to the Greek Cypriot voters, whether they should vote YES or NO, that is if they accept or reject the S.G. ‘s Plan for the solution of the Cyprus Problem and that this would take place before the 24 April referendum.  Such an impartial explanation never took place.

 

                  On the other hand, he stated that “this is not the time or the occasion to embark on a detailed analysis of the Annan plan. This will happen in the next few days and up until the time of the referenda” (p.3). Unfortunately, Papadopoulos did not keep his promise; however, he did reiterate several times that the Plan was “confusing and difficult to understand”.

 

(e)    Amongst some of the consequences of rejecting the plan that Papadopoulos forgot to mention to voters was the permanent presence of the Turkish occupation force on the island, which hung over the heads of Greek Cypriots like the Sword of Damocles. Demilitarisation of the island had always been a condition prioritised by the Greek Cypriot side during negotiations with the Turkish side. Nevertheless, Papadopoulos, ignoring the consequences, refrained from conveying these facts and instead advised the people to reject the plan, without explaining the consequences of the rejection, which was not only the  permanent presence of the Turkish forces and air force, which occupied 37% of Cyprus, but also to allow the cease-fire condition with Turkey to continue. The intention of the Turkish military regime to stay on indefinitely in Cyprus has time and time again been reaffirmed with statements made by the Turkish military and politicians.  Among such statements was one made by the former Turkish Foreign Minister Chaglayangil, during his visit to Cyprus on 20 February 1980.  Replying to a question on whether or not Turkey was planning to withdraw its forces from the island, he said that “the Turkish army will not give back with the signing of a paper what it has earned with the edge of its sword.”  The Secretary General however has succeeded in achieving what was seen as Impossible by Turkish authorities.  Article 8 of the Annan Plan, which specifically deals with demilitarisation states that “In addition to the disbanding of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot armed forces, the heavily armed 50,000 Turkish occupation force on the island will withdraw.  These forces will be replaced by Turkish and Greek contingents consisting of 6,000 men each.  132 Greek Cypriot villages will be included in the areas to be demilitarized and these contingents will carry out the duty of assisting a strong UN force.” More specifically, Mr. Papadopoulos, instead of warning the Greekcypriot voters that with Article 8 of the S.G.’ s Fifth Plan, the Greekcypriot side achieved what we had been asking in all the previous negotiations with the Turkishcypriot side, he chose to exaggerate the danger of the presence of 650 Turkish troops on the island saying the following:

“The permanent stationing of even a small number of Turkish troops in Cyprus, with extended intervention rights in the Greek Cypriot state with no mechanisms of guarantee, while we would have disbanded the National Guard, creates conditions of insecurity for the Greek Cypriots”(p.6).

 

This was an open and blatant distortion of the facts because the small number of

ordinary Turkish troops he mentioned was no other than the 650 strong Turkish army contingent stationed here together with the 960 strong Greek contingent ELDYK under the 1960 agreements, to train and drill the Cyprus Army.

The extent of the distortion emerges when a comparison between the presence

of 650 ordinary Turkish troops and the actual presence of the powerful occupation army is presented as a reason for the rejection of the Annan Plan.

 

(f)     So by urging the people to reject the S.G.’s Fifth Plan, Mr. Papadopoulos had promised new opportunities to resolve the Cyprus problem under more favourable conditions. So far, 25 months have passed since the referendum.  And yet, there has been no success in re-starting the Cyprus negotiations process.  Why?  Because the Greek Cypriot side has preferred to concentrate on the weaker points of the Annan Plan instead on looking at the positive accomplishments and gains provided (the actual reason why talks should have restarted).

 

The Secretary General has repeatedly requested from Mr. Papadopoulos that he submit in writing a concrete list of objections to the plan which he wishes to be discussed. Mr. Papadopoulos has persistently refused to present him with a list of such objections for the resumption of negotiations, and has reiterated, “we want neither deadlines nor  arbitration.”

 

(g)    Another important reason for the rejection of the plan was his attempt for the first time to influence voters in his address to the nation on 7 April 2004. Mr. Papadopoulos conveyed his message to deceive the masses by means of mass media. With the exception of the newspapers, ALITHIA and POLITIS, all media corporations, including ANTENNA, SIGMA and MEGA and the state radio and TV station, agreed not to publish or broadcast anything in contradiction to the President’s recommendation as set out in his12 page address to the nation.

 

For 17 days, since the day of President Tassos Papadopoulos’ Declaration, he  monopolized all the media institutions which was disturbing for many Cypriots and foreigners like the EU Commissioner for enlargement, Gunther Verheugen, who, while delivering a speech on the 21 April 2004 at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, he stated that “he felt ‘personally cheated’ by Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, calling on him to honour his pledge to the EU to support a political settlement” and that “EU Ministers were angered  by what they perceived as pre-referendum media manipulation by Papadopoulos as state and private Greek Cypriot television channels had refused to broadcast interviews with Verheugen and UN special envoy to Cyprus Alvaro de Soto”.(Keesing’s 2004, volume 50, no 4, p 45962) 

 

 

During the last 25 months after the Referendum, President Papadopoulos has repeatedly said that he is “ready” to resume “negotiations” to find a solution to the Cyprus problem under these 3 preconditions:

 

1) No deadlines or set timetables

2) No arbitration or third parties

3) Completion of preparations as to avoid a failure in negotiations.

 

If one looks carefully at these conditions, it can be clearly seen that Papadopoulos is trying to hide his determination not to solve the Cyprus problem. The first precondition foresees the resumption of negotiations without deadlines or a set timetable, just as it was before at all bi-communal negotiations, which didn’t solve the Cyprus problem. The second condition means endless negotiations and the third condition is, as the old saying goes,  “he who doesn’t want to go to the mill will spend his days grinding wheat”.

 

All these conditions are in contradiction with the conditions set forth by the UN Secretary General to which Papadopoulos had earlier agreed.  Papadopoulos had accepted these preconditions and continued negotiating at Bürgenstock, Switzerland and as a result, in his Declaration to the nation on the 7 April 2004, confessed the “there are improvements compared to the 3rd and 4th Annan plan” (p.4).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AKEL’S SECRETARY GENERAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER DIMITRIS CRISTOFIAS WAS CO-RESPONSIBLE FOR REJECTION OF ANNAN PLAN

 

 

 

On the 14th April 2004, AKEL, which supported President Tassos Papadopoulos’ election in February 2003, convened its party assembly to decide whether or not it would support the 5th version of the Annan Plan on the occasion of the 24 April referendum 2004.

Speaking at his party’s general assembly Dimitris Christofias, mentioned among other things, POSITIVE aspects of the Annan Plan: (p. 9-10)

 

 

1.      THE REUNIFICATION OF CYPRUS The Annan Plan foresees the reunification of Cyprus. The plan envisages a single sovereignty, one identity and one nationality based on a bi-communal and federal arrangement under the title of United Cyprus Republic.

 

2.      THE TURKISH ARMY WILL LEAVE CYPRUS The plan envisages the phased withdrawal of more than 39 thousand Turkish troops ending the invasion of the island.

 

3.      THE PHASED RETURN OF GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES 85-90 thousand refugees will be able to return to their homes under a phased programme. The right to return under the Turkish Cypriot authority is secured through great difficulties.

 

4.      HUMAN RIGHTS ARE SECURED Also subjected to a transition period, all human rights and basic freedoms are secured.

 

5.      MECHANISIMS IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE DEADLOCKS The plan envisages introducing a number of mechanisms and measures aimed to deal with deadlocks and impasses. These measures did not exist in the 1960 constitution.

 

6.      THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS ONLY 45 DAYS The transitional period is limited to only 45 days. The different organs of the state will be functional and come into force from day 1.

 

7.      TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL REALLY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REUNITE AND LIVE IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY A window of opportunity is opening in the long run for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reunite and to live in peace and prosperity.

 

8.      LIMITING THE NUMBER OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS The total population of Turkish immigrants for the first 19 years or until Turkey joins the EU will be limited to only 5% of the total population of the Turkish Cypriot State.  Later a special law protecting the demographic structure of the island will be introduced.

 

9.      THE CYPRUS POUND WILL REMAIN THE NATIONAL CURRENCY A central bank will be established and the Cyprus Pound will remain the national currency.

 

As Christofias continued with his speech he also touched upon the negative aspects of the Annan Plan, which were, among others, the following:

The imaginary threat posed by the presence of a contingent of 650 troops (as mentioned above).

 

This was in fact distorting reality since according to the UN Secretary-General’s Fifth plan, the security of the Greek Cypriot population was to be provided by the presence of a Greek Contingent and a United Nations force which would be withdrawn once the demilitarization of the island was completed.

 

The continued presence of 60 - 70,000 settlers

At this point Christofias was referring to an article in the plan, which mentioned that according to the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, the Greek ELDIK regiment and a Turkish Regiment together with the UN Peacekeeping Force which came to the island in January 1964, would remain on the island.

 

There is a permanent deviation from the European body of law and the plan foresees that only 1/3 of the Turkish Cypriot entity could be non-Turkish speaking.

 

These negative aspects of the Annan Plan are of no importance compared to the threats mentioned above and of the de facto situation, which remains in place today.

 

The final decision of the General Assembly was to ask the U.N. Secretary General “to postpone the referendum on the UN Secretary General’s plan for a few months so that it could be impartially put to the vote of the people”.  The AKEL members would then support the approval of the plan.

As a result AKEL’s proposal was accepted with 64.8%of the votes.

 

All the above-mentioned were included in Christofias’ speech his party’s General Assembly on the 14 April 2004, in which, according to information obtained by the department of Press and Information Office (15/04/2004) stated: “On condition that the party accepts the conditions of postponement, AKEL Secretary General Dimitris Christofias said that naturally “a different kind” of referenda would be held.”

 

Asked to clarify what he meant by this, he said: If the referenda are postponed and if AKEL’s demands to renegotiate certain points in the plan is met, then AKEL’s answer to the plan will be YES.”

 

Before ending his speech, Christofias said:

“Our party today is face to face with a plan. This plan, no matter what consequences it may have, good or bad, provides a unique opportunity and hope for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together in peace. AKEL does not agree with the President’s views that the plan does not end the de-facto partition on the island and that it in fact legalizes it. The party leadership will convey its views to the President in the dialogue of cooperation that exists.

I would like to reassure you that the central committee’s proposal is reliable and worthy. It has in fact created a new dynamic within the party. Neither the UN Secretary General nor many of the international players have rejected our proposal. The international community is seriously looking into the possibility and are engaged in dialogue with the interested parties.”

 

At this point I would like to note that this argument posed by Mr. Christofias seems to agree with the reality since “the circles of the U.N. Secretary-General” knew that five years before a Referendum, the Council of the 8 Greatest Leaders of the world decided to ask the U.N. Security Council to hurry over the solution of the Cyprus Problem with strenuous negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

 

And in fact, during the last five years the Secretary-General, after receiving instructions by the Security Council, contacted strenuous negotiations, which, as he mentioned in his report to the Security Council, dated 1st April 2003, cost to the United Nations $3.148.500 dollars.

 

The results of these negotiations were the Third, Fourth and Fifth Plan proposed by the UN Secretary-General, which were approved by the Security Council and for which the Referendum was held.

 

As a consequence, “the circles of the U.N. Secretary General” couldn’t favor Mr. Christofias’ s idea for “postponing the Referendum for a few months in order to re-discuss the Cyprus Problem”. 

    

A few days later, after meeting with Tassos Papadopoulos, Christofias requested from the Secretary General that more time be provided for negotiations to continue. This request however was turned down by Mr. Annan prompting Christofias to tell AKEL members to reject the plan. 

This decision was in complete contradiction to everything Christofias had said in his speech: The advantages of accepting the plan were so much greater than any threat Papadopoulos had talked about and therefore Christofias was under the obligation (no matter the fact that the UN Secretary General had rejected the request to extend the negotiations - since strenuous negotiations had been going on for 4 years) to tell AKEL members to accept the 5th Version of the Plan as it was.

 

Anyone who reads about the pros and cons of accepting the UN Secretary General’s plan should arrive at these conclusions:

a)      The advantages of accepting the plan were much greater than any of the opposing arguments presented.

b)      The arguments made in favor of extending the negotiation period were not convincing as the UN Secretary General had been conducting negotiations with representatives of the two sides from 1999 until 2003 and finally again at Bürgenstock, Switzerland in 2004. The UN Security Council, in line with resolution 1475 dated 14 April, congratulated the two sides on the conclusions of their arguments. It is therefore uncertain whether or not the postponement of the referenda by the UN Secretary General would have in fact resulted in the improvement and amendment of the plan.

 

Taking into account the last Parliamentary elections of 21st May 2006, AKEL’s elective power was 31%. This elective power voted in the Referendum of 24th April 2004, according to Mr. Christofias’ speech FOR a “Resounding NO”, against the Plan with 76%, which included the 31% of AKEL’s elective power. If at least 27% of AKEL’s members voted YES, the positive result of the referendum would increase to 51% (24%+27%) and the negative result would decrease to 49% (76%-27%).

 

In other words, if Mr. Christofias was consistent with his observation that the advantages of the Annan Plan were stronger than the negative ones, then the result of the referendum, if this took place without any delay, would by 51% in favor of YES (24%+27%) and 49% in favor of NO (76%-27%).

 

 Therefore, Mr. Christofias’ speech of 14th April 2004 should have ended with the recommendation to the members of AKEL to vote YES in the Referendum, and thus the result would have been a POSITIVE YES, which would have meant that the people of Cyprus considered the Secretary-General’s Fifth Plan, which was approved by the Security Council, to be suitable for a final solution to the long-unsolved problem of Cyprus.